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IN THE SUPRmtB COURT

OF THE STATE OF trrAH

------ . -- ~

JOON J. SWEENEY,

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

.•
..
••

vs.

Case No. 10259

HAPPY VALLEY, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

...

Defendant and
Re·apondent.

-------- - - REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

- --- - -----PRELlMINARY STATEMENT

Thie case, involving as it does a record of
1261 pages, is rather complicated as to the facts ·
involved.

A correct statement and understanding of

the facts, as well as the author~ties cited, is

essential to a fair appraisal as to the respective
tights and duties of the parties.

In its Brief,

Responde~t

takes issue with

the Statement·of Facts as contained in Appellant's

Brief and submits its own Statement of Facts (Reap.
Br. p. 4).

Rule 75(p)(2), Utah Rules of Civil
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procedure, directs that if Respondent controverts
the Statement of Facts as set out in Appellant's

Brief, "• •• he shall state wherein such statement
is inconsistent with the facts. • • "

Respondent,

though levelling a general charge that Appellant made

erroneous and misleading citations of fact, cited no

...

specific instances where this was the case.

In a

carefuLreading of Appellant's Brief, it is diffi•
cult to find any statement inconsistent with the
Record, or for that matter, inconsistent with the
Statement of Facts made by Respondent.
To the contrary, however, the Statement of
Facts set out by Respondent is replete with argument, supposition, conclusion and misquotes from the
Record.

This liberty with the Record introduces neW

material which we believe justifies a reply thereto.
A reply is likewise justified, we feel, to the mis•

application and misconstruction, of case authority
·•'1

which likewise introddced:; new material for.. the
Court's consideration.
Under

Poin~

I,.we shall

ap~cifically

indicate
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wherein Respondent's Statement of Facts is inconsistant with the facts.

Under Point II, we shall

specifically indicate wherein we feel certain of the
authorities cited by Respondent are not in point.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
· IN ITS STATEMENT OF FACTS, THE RESPONDENT
HAS MADE STATEMENTS INCONSISTENT wrm THE
FACTS AND MISQUOTED THE RECORD.

1, At page 5 of its Brief, Respondent states,
"The contract provided, inter alia, that
that Happy Valley would purchase under
contract from third parties the selected
acreage • • • • " (Emphasis added)
We find no such provision in the contract as
to future purchase of the selected acreage.

To the

contrary, the contract does say:
"THAT WHEREAS, First Party (Happy Valley)
is the owner of or is entitled to sell
certain land situated in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, consisting of approximately
three hundred and sixty-six (366) acres,
hereinafter referred to as 'Entire Premises',
and more particularly described in Exhibit
A attached hereto and bj reference made a
part hereof; and • • • " (R. 137)
This invention of fact by Respondent is, of
course, significant.

When considered with other

- 4 misstatements as hereinafter set out, the pattern

from which Respondent cuts the cloth of its case
becomes obvious.

They would have us believe that

this transaction was a scheme, a land promotion, a
development, and that the risk thereof should have
been assumed by both parties.

When it started to

sour, as they claim, because of "unforeseen" and "tin-

expected" difficulties (Resp. Br., pp 6-7), then
they were justified in self deals and other transactions not contemplated in the contract

~o

save the

day.

2, On page 6 of its Brief, Respondent states:
6. It was proposed under the 1957 contract that costs of acquiring the 366 acres
as well as subdivision and development expenses of the residential.properties were
to be substantially financed through proceeds from property sales within the
development."
11

0

We do not find where this was proposed under
the 1957 contract.

The proposal was that First

Party would :
" • • • develop said Entire Premises and to
subdivide a portion thereof for residential
building lots. • • " (R. 137)

- 5 It was represented by Respondent at the time
it signed the contract that, ". • • it has the right

to enter into a contract to sell said Entire Premiaes, or any part thereof • • • "

(R. 129)

It may have been the undisclosed intent of
Respondent that proceeds of sales would keep the
payments current on real estate contracts and improvements

(~.

367), but this was not proposed under the

1957 contract.

3. On page 6 of its Brief, Respondent refers to
''unforeseen difficulties," "unforeseen events • • •
unanticipated by the contract."

It is the grossest

type of supposition to tickle the imagination as to
what was foreseen, unforeseen, anticipated or unan•
ticipated under the contract.

The contract

sp~aks

for itself.

4, . On page 6 of its Brief, Respohdent states:
"(a) Sweeney, acting for Second Party,
notified Happy Valley tQat Willow Creek
Country Club required fee title to the
property underlying the golf course
facilities. This was not envisioned by
the 1957 contract."
In the first place, it was not Mr. Sweeney,

- 6 ~cting

for the Second Party, who requested fee title

for the Country Club. )l'he request was made by
If.

•

•

.. .

II

Club representatives, including Mr. Sweeney,
(R. 534)
In the

sec~nd

place, it·was envisioned by the

1957 contract that fee title would be given to the
Willow Creek Country Club.

Respondent was to "

On completion of payment, -·

convey a marketable title to

the Club Premises to the Willow Creek Country Club
by good and sufficient warranty deed."

(R. 139)

In the third place, ·payment in full and the
request for fee title ·was made by the Country Club

in 1959 (R. 1145), just a few months in advance of
the date of final payment as provided in the contract.
5.

(R. 138)

The "unforeseen difficulties" (Resp. Br. p. 6)

were not and should not have been unforeseen. · At
least as early as 1958 Respondent anticipated off•
Bite improvements in the Willow' Creek area.

1131)

(R.

Mr. Burton, one of the principals in Respon•

dent .Company, had engaged in the development and

- 7 promotion of a great number of subdivision properties prior to the Happy Valley development (R. 11371138).

Development of lots was not held up by un-

foreseen difficulties with the County, but because
of lack of funds (R. 530).

And lack of funds is

difficult to imagine since $150,000.00 had been received from the Country Club in 1958 and 1959 (R.
529).

Improvements in Subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 were

completed in the forepart of 1959 (R. 530).

6. As to the activity in the market during 1959 and
1960 (Resp. Br., p. 6), it would appear Respondent
discharged its sales agent sometime in 1958 (R.
522), accused its sales agent of a premature sales
program and didn't authorize the resumption of sales
activity until January 12, 1960.

(Exhibit 29-P)

7. On page 8 of Respondent's Brief, Respondent
states:
''Sweeney did not want to buy any lots at
$3,000.00, and did not offer to buy after
they were platted and available for sale."

- 8 -

This is a twisting of the Record.

The testi-

mony was that SWeeney had never been offered any
lots for $3,000.00 and at the time of trial was not
interested in buying any lots at that price (R. 1082,
1083).

He attempted to purchase lots in 1958 and

1959 and was refused (R. 1085, 1086).

He did not

attempt a purchase after that time.
8.

On

page 8 of Respondent's Brief, it is stated

that in January, 1962, Happy Valley sold to 25 Associates, Inc. and R. E. Mcconaughy, 31 acres for resi-

dential purposes in consideration for 50.9% of the
Second Party interest, having a reasonable cash
value of $42,908.00.
There is no testimony in the Record as to the
proposed use contemplated by the Grantee, that there

was any restriction on the sale, or that, in fact,
the 31 acres would be used for residential purposes.
Nor is the phrase "reasonable cash value" found in
the testimony, this phrase later finding its way into
the Findings of Fact by the Court.
The figure of $42,908.00 was arrived at by a

- 9 -

mathematical process contributed by Mr. Burton, a
principal of Respondent Corporation.

(R. 1152)

The basis of this computation was a figure by which

Mr. Safford, one of the Second Party, lost his inter, est in default of a sum of money owing and overdue
from Mr. Safford to Mr. Graff, another principal of
Respondent Corporation.

(R. 519, 520)

There is no

evidence or testimony that the 25 Associates, Inc.,
and Mcconaughy ever talked in terms of $42,908.00 as
the value of their interest.

Since in May, 1960,

the Second Party, as noted by Respondent (Resp. Br.,

p. 39), equated the value of 75 lots at $3,333.00
per lot and valued its total interest at $250,000.00

(R. 1095), it is hard to believe that 25 Associates,
Inc. and Mcconaughy, representing 50.9% of Second

Party, were willing to sell their interest in January,
1962, for $42,908.00.

Fixing a figure of $42,908.00

as a "reasonable cash value" for the 50. 9% interest,
and then translating that figure as the "gross proceeds" realized from the sale of 31 acres for the

Purpose of an accounting to Mr. Sweeney, was possibly

- 10 -

the most patent error of the trial court.

9,

Though perhaps of minor consequence, it is

noted that on page 15 of Respondent's Brief the
statement is made,
"To begin with, not one count of Sweeney's
Complaint, Amended Complaint, or Second
Amended Complaint remotely suggests or
raises an ex contractu claim."
If this is the case, then apparently there

was a grave misunderstanding by Counsel for Respondent.
In its "Memorandum In Support of Defendants 1 Motion,"

Respondent states:
"This action was commenced by Plaintiff 1s
original Complaint which appeared to be
bottomed upon an alleged breach of a
written agreement." (R. 111)
As to the Amended Complaint, Counsel for
Respondent states:
"In his alleged Second Cause of Action,
plaintiff apparently contends that there
had been a breach of the agreement, • • • "
(R. 112)

And further refers to the Second Cause of

A~tion

as:

"II. The Alleged Second Cause of Action
(Breach of Contract)."
That Counsel for Appellant always considered
the Second Cause of Action as one involving a breach

- 11 -

of contract is evidenced by his language in a Trial

Memorandum.

(R. 104)

10. • On page 41 of its Brief, Respondent quotes from

and refers to "SWeeney' s Trial Brief."

This Trial

Brief is not in the record nor was it designated as
a part of the record.
to be improper.

Referral thereto would appear

As a matter of fact, there is no

such thing as "Sweeney's Trial Brief."

Mr. Sweeney

did file an instrument entitled "Plaintiff's Opening
Argument" in which the paragraph quoted by Respondent is stated.

In reply to Respondent's suggestion

of inconsistency and bad faith on the part of

Sweeney in accepting the off-site improvement cost
as "gross proceed" in relation to the transaction
with Estates, Inc., we ask the Court to remember that,
in fact, Sweeney had been put to the rack.

Respon-

dent had refused to account for said sale on the
basis of the development of said two and one-half
acres as residential lots, which would, of course,
have been considerably more.

In the spirit of compro•

miae, Sweeney was willing, at that time, to pick up

- 12 any crumbs Respondent was willing to throw out.

But

accepting the $13,742.85 figure as the gross proceeds

for the transfer does not mean that the manner in
which said figure was determined was correct or that
said accounting was consistent with the provisions
of the contract.

POINT II
RESPONDENT HAS MISCONSTRUED, MISAPPLIED AND
MISINTERPRETED CERTAIN AlITHORITIES AS CITED.
Apparently it is the position of the Respondent that though there were certain related questions
of law involved, the nub Qf the suit was for an

accounting and injunction.
!

(Resp. Br., p. 14).

Assuming the major issues to be equitable in nature,
Respondent then quotes Norback vs. Board of Directors

2!. Church Extension Soc., 84 Utah 506, 37 P. 2d 339
(1934) as final authority for the position that

Appellant has no right to a jury trial.
p, 20)

(Resp. Br.,

With a flip of the hand they summarily

d~s-

miss the later case of Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks,
119 Utah 204, 225 p, 2d 739 (1950) in which the Court
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materially changed and expanded the Norback rule.
(Resp. Br., p. 23)
Appellant, of course, takes the position that
the main or primary issues involved were legal.

Re-

spondent recognized these legal issues to be the
interpretation of the 1957 contract, the issue as to
whether Sweeney was entitled to an accounting on
"gross proceeds of sales" or "market value of the
properties" or some other standard, the issue of
good faith as to sales to the Directors.
p. 14)

(Resp. Br.,

These issues we suggest are the very guts of

the case.

"

The fact that equitable relief may

be prayed for, to carry into effect the judgment
based upon the legal issues is not sufficient to
deprive either party of his rights to have the legal
issues submitted to the jury."
~s.

(State ex rel Hansen

Hart, 26 Utah, 220, 72 P. 938, as quoted in

fu>rback v. Board of Directors, supra)

The mistake

made by the trial judge in this case was that he
couldn't separate the right involved from the remedy
sought.

In proper perspective, Appellant's position

- 14 is perfectly consistent with the Norback rule.

But assuming, as Respondent contends, that
the equitable issues were the nub of the suit, then
what?

In the case of Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks,

119 U. 204, 225 P. 2d 739 (1950), the trial court

refused a jury trial on the basis of the Norback rule
regarding major, minor issues. (225 P. 2d, p. 750)
The Supreme Court rejected the Norback rule, or at
least materially altered the rule, by stating:
'~ppraised in light of the California rule,
the Norback case is apparently correct in
result, but the rule there laid down as to
when litigants are entitled to a trial by
jury, which we have quoted above, cannot be
reconciled with the California rule which
we have approved and adopted in this opinion. There may be certain types of cases,
although none occur to us now, in which the
issues of fact in the legal cause of action
are so intertwined with the issues of fact
in the equitable cause of action that they
cannot be separated for the purpose of trial
by jury. Only then would it seem that the
court should determine whether the major
issue or issued are legal or equitable and
grant or deny a jury trial accordingly.
Othersise the parties should be entitled.to
a jury trial on the issues of fact in the
legal cause of action." (225 P. 2d p. 750)

We would submit, therefore, that the Norback
rule, relied upon by Respondent, is not the rule as

- 15 as

to the right to a jury trial where mixed legal and

equitable issues are involved in the same proceeding.
Regardless of the paramount object of Plaintiff's
action, the primary relief sought, either party is
entitled to a jury trial on the issues of fact in the
legal cause of action.
In passing, we refer to the opinion of Justice
Wade concurring and dissenting in part in the Valley
Mortuary case.

Justice Wade refers to Section

78-21-1, U.C.A. 1953, which provides:
"In actions for the recovery of specific
real or personal property, with or without damages, or for money claimed as due
upon contract or as damages for breach of
contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact
may be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial
is waived." (225 P. 2d, p. 752)
Justice Wade then states:
"This section fixes the right of a jury
trial on all issues of fact involved in determining whether any of the kinds of relief therein specified should be granted
and if so the amount and extent thereof.
Under its provisions the right to such trial
does not depend on whether the issues presented are legal or equitable, nor on whether that kind of action would have beeq
maintainable in a law court under the dual
court system. The test under this statute
is whether the kind of relief specified

- 16 therein is sought in the action. If such
relief is sought, then a jury trial is
granted on all issues of fact involving
such relief but it does not require a jury
trial on issues of fact involved in the
granting of other kinds of relief which is
sought in the same action.
" (225 P. 2d
p. 752) (Emphasis added)
Justice Wade then suggests that if we would
follow the statute the problem of determining when a
jury trial should be granted would be greatly simplified and notes the confusion perpetrated by the law1

equity distinction, especially under the New Rules of
Procedure with law and equity administered in one
Court.

( 225 P. 2d, p. 753)
The whole gist and basic purpose of this action

has been to recover money claimed as due upon con-

tract.

Applying the thinking of Justice Wade, it

wuld appear that Appellant is entitled to a jury
trial on the issues of fact involved.
Respondent, in its Brief at page 23, also
makes fleeting reference to the case of Dairy Queen
1

Y.:.Jlood 1 369 U.S. 469, 8 L. Ed 2d 44 (1962) as quoted
by Appellant.

It is not claimed that the Dairy Queen

case is stare decisis or binding upon this Court•

- 17 It is claimed that the rule of that case is prece-

dent where both legal and equitable issues are involved in the same proceeding and that the rationale
of the case is very persuasive.

Respondent goes on

to suggest that in any event Utah has established
a different constituional precedent in regard to
jury trial and cites the cases of West v. West, 16 U.
2d 411, 403 P. 2d 22 (1965), Lane v. Peterson, 68 U.

585, 251 Pac. 374 (1926), and Kimball v. McCormack,
70 U. 189, 259 Pac. 331 (1926) as establishing said
precedent.

Interestingly enough, the issue of a

jury trial was not raised in any one of those cases.
It is difficult to see where those cases establish

any precedent whatever in relation to the problem
treated in the Dairy Queen v. Wood case, .to-wit:
the right to treat by jury where legal issues are
incidental to equitable issues.
CONCLUSION
It appears to us that the case never really
got off the ground.

in collateral issues.

Court and Counsel became mired
To state the facts accurately

- 18 has been difficult.

Basically, the question of

the case is whether Defendant-Respondent performed
as it was obligated to do under a written contract.
Errors made in the trial court prevented Plaintiff•
Appellant from an adequate presentation of its
case.

It goes without argument that the right to
a jury trial as guaranteed by our Constitution and
provided by statute should be jealously guarded.
Particularly would this seem to be so in consider•
at ion of the very nature of the instant case.

Per•

sonalities were involved and the plausibility of
their statements is of vital importance.

Volum-

inous testimony as to property evaluation and the
reasonableness thereof was involved.

Such circum-

stance would tax the composite thinking of eight
men, let alone one man, regardless of the cut of
his robe or the wisdom of his judgment.

Appellant

is entitled to a jury trial of the legal issues of
fact involved.

The judgment of the trial court
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should be reversed and a new trial granted.
Respectfully submitted,
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
FRANKLYN B. MATHESON
Nielsen, Conder, Hansen &
Henriod
510 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant

